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ABSTRACT 
 
DAPHNE A. FRUCHTMAN: “They acted pretty much as man and wife”:  
Race, Slavery, and the Borders of Marriage and Family in the Antebellum South 
(Under the direction of Heather Williams) 
 
 
During the first decades of the nineteenth century, a small number of wealthy, 
unmarried planters did something unexpected: they entered into publicly recognized, 
quasi-marital relationships with enslaved women. In doing so, they not only pushed 
social boundaries, but specifically sought legal protection and legitimization of their 
interracial families through a particular legal device: their wills. The pointedly public 
aspect of these relationships and the varying levels of communal toleration for such 
openness, however, depart from the conventional scholarly framing of sexual 
relationships between masters and slaves. Historians have largely—and rightly—
conceived of the antebellum South as a place where racial hierarchy was fiercely 
enforced and where interracial sex between masters and slaves was defined by coercion 
and rape and acceptable only when shrouded in a culture of secrecy. Indeed, many 
historians argue that such interracial connections were culturally acceptable in southern 
communities precisely because they existed outside the realms of both legal and social 
recognition and thus did not challenge the existing racial hierarchy or the sanctity of the 
white family. In this thesis, in contrast, I argue that a small but socially significant group 
of white southern planters complicated this view by living publicly as husband and wife 
with enslaved black women. Local communities often struggled with how best to 
 iv
reconcile these public acknowledgements of interracial families, but the often successful 
efforts of those few white men who entered into quasi-marital interracial relationships to 
secure social and legal recognition for their enslaved families signaled a surprising level 
of communal toleration for the public airing of interracial intimacy. 
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Introduction 
 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court had good news for the interracial 
couple Richard and Mildred Loving: their marriage was legal. The justices’ unanimous 
ruling in the landmark case of Loving v. Virginia finally struck down the remaining anti-
miscegenation laws that had existed in various iterations throughout the United States 
since the eighteenth century and that, in the 1960s, were still a significant force in the 
South.1 While the Civil Rights Movement thrust this contention over acceptable 
definitions of family and marriage into the limelight during the mid-twentieth century, 
interracial partners and interracial families were by no means a twentieth-century 
development. Like the anti-miscegenation laws against which they struggled, men and 
women had dared to cross the color line in America since the first ships landed at 
Jamestown. In fact, a few of the earliest and most significant challenges to white 
society’s dominant definition of marriage and family as racially homogenous arose out of 
the unlikeliest of dissenters: a small number of powerful antebellum southern planters 
and their enslaved African-American partners and children.  
During the first decades of the nineteenth century, a small number of wealthy, 
unmarried planters did something unexpected: they entered into publicly recognized, 
quasi-marital relationships with enslaved women. In doing so, they not only pushed 
social boundaries, but specifically sought legal protection and legitimization of their 
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 Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967). 
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interracial families through a particular legal device: their wills.2 The pointedly public 
aspect of these relationships and the varying levels of communal toleration for such 
openness, however, depart from the conventional scholarly framing of sexual 
relationships between masters and slaves. Historians have largely—and rightly—
conceived of the antebellum South as a place where racial hierarchy was fiercely 
enforced and where interracial sex between masters and slaves was defined by coercion 
and rape and acceptable only when shrouded in a culture of secrecy. Indeed, historians 
have traditionally divided discussions of master-slave sexual relationships into two 
categories: coercive and abusive relationships on the part of masters or calculating and 
manipulative relationships on the part of slaves.3 Furthermore, both types of relationships 
were similarly defined as open secrets; many historians argue that such interracial 
connections were culturally acceptable in southern communities precisely because they 
existed outside the realms of both legal and social recognition and thus did not challenge 
the existing racial hierarchy or the sanctity of the white family.4 In this thesis, in contrast, 
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 Bernie Jones identifies many of the probate cases that revolved around these wills in Fathers of 
Conscience: Mixed-Race Inheritance in the Antebellum South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009). 
 
3
 See, for example, Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: 
First Vintage Books, 1976), 413-31; Mary Diedrich, “My Love is Black as Yours is Fair: Premarital Love and 
Sexuality in Antebellum Slave Narrative,” Phylon 47, no. 3 (1986): 238-247; Emily West, Chains of Love: 
Slave Couples in Antebellum South Carolina (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004); Peter Bardaglio, 
“’Shameful Matches’: The Regulation of Interracial Sex and Marriage in the South before 1900” in Martha 
Hodes, ed., Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History (New York: New York 
University Press, 1999); Sharon Block, “Lines of Color, Sex, and Service: Comparative Sexual Coercion in 
Early America” in Martha Hodes, ed., Sex, Love, Race. 
 
4
 Charles Frank Robinson II is one of the few who goes against this grain. He acknowledges that 
southern society allowed some instances of interracial relationships to go unchecked because the institution of 
slavery mitigated antebellum fears that these couples could pose a real threat to the social order. This view, 
however, does not consider that the instances of publicly recognized interracial relationships in which white 
men also attempted to secure legal legitimization of their partnerships through their wills appeared with greater, 
rather than less, frequency as the United States moved towards Civil War. Robinson’s argument implies, 
however, that public legitimization of such relationships would decrease in response to the heavy assault slavery 
was enduring from the North and the corresponding increase in southern fear that the permanence of its 
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I argue that a small but socially significant group of white southern planters complicated 
this view by living publicly as husband and wife with enslaved black women. Local 
communities often struggled with how best to reconcile these public acknowledgements 
of interracial families, but the often successful efforts of those few white men who 
entered into quasi-marital interracial relationships to secure social and legal recognition 
for their enslaved families signaled a surprising level of communal toleration for the 
public airing of interracial intimacy.  
The stories of these couples, and especially of the men who pushed their 
communities and the courts to view their enslaved partners and children within the 
contexts of marriage and family, are largely preserved in state appeals court cases that 
arose from county probate and chancery courts in a number of slave states.5 Recently, 
some legal historians have paid particular attention to this unique body of cases.6 In 
Fathers of Conscience: Mixed-Race Inheritance in the Antebellum South, Bernie Jones 
                                                                                                                                                                            
institutionalized racial hierarchy was in jeopardy. Robinson, Dangerous Liaisons: Sex and Love in the 
Segregated South (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 2003). 
 
5
 A search of state appellate court records suggests that testamentary cases addressing publicly 
recognized interracial families of elite white men and enslaved black women were uniquely nineteenth-century 
phenomena. The largest concentration of cases fell between the 1830s and 1850s, though records from the 
1800s through the 1820s can be found with greatly diminished frequency. Fourteen of the 16 appellate cases I 
have identified, as referenced in note 13, represent this 1830-1860 timeframe, with the two outliers dating to 
1809 and 1823. The only scholar to specifically survey appellate cases that detail instances of interracial 
liaisons between white men and enslaved women is legal historian Bernie Jones, who notes that Bates v. 
Holman (1809) represented an “early case.” The corpus of appellate inheritance cases Jones identifies fall 
heavily between the decades of the 1830s and 1850s, further supporting this nineteenth-century time frame. 
Bernie D. Jones, Fathers of Conscience: Mixed-Race Inheritance in the Antebellum South (Athens: The 
University of Georgia Press, 2009), 24, 157.  
 
6
 Adrienne D. Davis, “The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective,” Stanford Law 
Review 51, no. 2 (January 1999): 221-288; Bernie D. Jones, Fathers of Conscience: Mixed-Race Inheritance in 
the Antebellum South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009); John Wertheimer, Daphne Fruchtman, et. 
al., “Willis v. Jolliffe: Love and Slavery on the South Carolina-Ohio Borderlands” in Tony Freyer and Lyndsay 
Campbell, eds., Freedom’s Conditions in the U.S. Canadian Borderlands in the Age of Emancipation (Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2011); Kevin Noble Maillard, “Slaves in the Family: Testamentary Freedom and 
Interracial Deviance,” Syracuse University SUrface College of Law Faculty Scholarship (July 2012). 
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identifies 24 such appellate cases across eight slave states that revolved around the 
attempted legitimization of quasi-marital partnerships and enslaved families of white 
male testators.7 Jones and others are especially interested in what these cases can reveal 
about legal tensions between protecting the institution of slavery and protecting the rights 
of men to dispose of property however they saw fit. Their interest is largely focused on 
retracing the logic with which judges arrived at their decisions to uphold or overturn 
these men’s wills. These cases and their frequently rich testimony from white locals, 
however, have not been deeply mined for their social implications outside of the 
courtroom. This paper seeks to address this deficit by exploring the ways in which these 
relationships mimicked the social aspects of marriage and to address how communities 
interacted with these interracial couples and sought to place them within existing social 
structures.  
Scholars largely agree on what constituted traditional responsibilities of husbands 
and wives and the roles they were expected to undertake to fulfill the requirements of 
institutionalized marriage in the nineteenth century. According to Steven Mintz and 
Susan Kellogg, the “model husband and father” was responsible for the family’s 
livelihood and for providing for them after his death, while the “ideal wife and mother” 
was concerned with the home—specifically, the rearing of the children and maintenance 
of a smoothly operating household.8 These obligations of married life existed primarily 
                                                        
7
 Jones, Fathers of Conscience, 157. 
 
8
 Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg, Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life 
(New York: The Free Press, 1988), 53. See also Peter W. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, 
Sex, and the Law in the Nineteenth Century (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995); 
Norma Basch, “Marriage and Domestic Relations” in Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins, eds., The 
Cambridge History of Law in America, vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Karen Lystra, 
Searching the Heart: Women, Men and Romantic Love in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989). 
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within the household, but the fulfillment of marital roles necessarily involved an element 
of public performance. Indeed, for a marriage to be meaningful within a social context, it 
required communal acknowledgment in addition to each partner’s fulfillment of 
prescribed spousal roles. A combing of these public marriage-like relationships between 
enslaved women and elite men through court testimony, church documents, census 
records, and newspaper accounts indicates that such couples were largely imagined by 
their communities as fulfilling the public and private conditions of marriage. 
By shifting this particular category of master-slave relationships from a 
traditionally conceived framework of abuse and secrecy to an adaptation of marriage, I do 
not propose to erase the significant power imbalance between free men and enslaved 
women, or to imply that the women in these relationships were madly in love with their 
partners. Some scholars challenge the notion that consent was even possible between 
black women and white men in the antebellum South—especially when the sexual 
relations were between masters and their slaves.9 This is an important issue that merits 
exploration with respect to the women involved in these cases, but these questions fall 
beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, I contend that many enslaved women in publicly 
acknowledged relationships with powerful white men possessed a level of social freedom 
and power in their roles as wives and mothers that was suggestive of the structural 
dynamics of nineteenth-century marriage. The nature of the testamentary evidence that 
illuminates these quasi-marital relationships unavoidably reveals much more about the 
                                                        
9
 Angela Davis argues that abuse and coercion are inseparable elements of any sexual relations 
between masters and slaves and suggestions that “slave women welcomed and encouraged the sexual attentions 
of white men” are not tenable in a racially stratified power system where “white men, by virtue of their 
economic position, had unlimited access to Black women’s bodies.” Women, Race, and Class (New York: First 
Vintage Book, 1983), 25-6. See also, Adrienne Davis, “Slavery and the Roots of Sexual Harassment,” in 
Catherine A. MacKinnon and Reva Siegel, eds., Directions in Sexual Harassment Law (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004).  
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men and the society in which they lived than it does about the thoughts of the enslaved 
women. This paper is designed to capitalize upon the strengths of these records by 
exploring how local white communities and the men who entered these relationships 
interrogated and conceived of the bounds of marriage and family. 
The attempts of some southern men to lend legal legitimacy to their unorthodox 
master-slave relationships through public acknowledgement of enslaved families suggests 
that space could be created for interracial renderings of marriage and family in 
antebellum southern society. Furthermore, the frequent return of judgments favoring the 
African-American women and children over more distant white relations exposes cracks 
in the racial segregation of American social and private life over 150 years before the 
Supreme Court ruled in the landmark interracial marriage case of Loving v. Virginia. Two 
representative case studies—one of the Maryland couple Thomas and Caroline Cramphin 
and the other of the South Carolina couple Elijah and Amy Willis—provide a wealth of 
evidence from which to explore the similar ways that these relationships developed 
privately, publicly, and legally in their respective communities.  But before turning to the 
stories of the Cramphins and the Willises, it is necessary to explore the legal culture in 
which these antebellum manumission and inheritance court cases arose.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Testamentary Manumission and Southern Legal Culture 
 
Manumissions were a part of American slavery since its inception, but their 
history was neither steadily progressive nor cohesive among the states. Nonetheless, a 
long tradition of owners using legal tools such as deeds, wills, and legislative decrees to 
free certain slaves—perhaps a trusted domestic servant or an enslaved child—endured 
periods of both popularity and illegality throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. While some states outlawed manumissions or created stringent regulations to 
decrease their frequency, other states moved to make manumission more accessible to 
slave owners.10 A number also moved sporadically along this spectrum, shifting multiple 
times between periods of allowing and banning slave manumissions.11 Even within the 
diverse and often conflicting legal contexts of individual state manumission laws, 
however, discernable trends concerning the ways that elite men attempted to employ 
testamentary manumission cut across the antebellum South.  
Beginning sporadically in the more northern slave states at the turn of the 
nineteenth century and growing in frequency until the Civil War, a peculiar group of 
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 South Carolina, for instance, has 379 surviving deeds of manumission on file for the period of 1737-
1785. Jane Landers, Against the Odds: Free Blacks in the Slave Societies of the Americas (Portland: Frank Cass, 
1996), 4. Virginia, meanwhile, banned legal manumission from 1723-1782, while Maryland moved to expand 
legal deeded manumission to include testamentary manumission in 1790. Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: 
The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 278. 
 
11
 Virginia was one such region that vacillated back and forth. In 1691 the General Assembly added the 
caveat to their manumission regulations that manumitted persons be required to leave the state. Legislators then 
made manumissions illegal between 1723 and 1782, but then reopened the doors to manumission in the wake of 
the Revolutionary War until 1806, when the law once again required manumitted slaves to leave the state within 
12 months. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll, 51; Jordan, White Over Black, 347. 
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hybrid wills that combined manumission and significant inheritance appeared in state 
appellate courts throughout the South. In these wills, plantation masters sought to free 
their enslaved partners and children for the express purpose of publicly recognizing them 
as legitimate heirs—as their family.12 Ten of the slave states contained at least one such 
inheritance case that reached the state appellate level between the American Revolution 
and the Civil War.13 Though small in number, it is important to recognize that only a 
minute fraction of cases heard by county courts reached the state appellate level. Most 
trials began and ended in local courts. Furthermore, records of local trial cases are spread 
throughout hundreds of county court archives across the South, and unlike state appellate 
court cases, the subjects of these trials are not often indexed. This reality ensures the 
impossibility of pinpointing how prevalent such quasi-marital relationships were in the 
legal record.14 However, the fact that a majority of southern state appellate courts heard 
strikingly similar versions of these peculiar interracial testamentary cases during the 
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 Contestations over such wills reached the appellate courts of the border states Virginia and Maryland 
between the 1800s and 1820s, while the Carolinas and states further South did not see similar appellate cases 
until the 1830s and 40s. See note 13 for an overview of these cases and their dates. 
 
13
 Alabama: Pool’s Heirs v. Pool’s Executors, 33 Ala. 145 (1858). Arkansas: Campbell v. Campbell, 
13 Ark. 513 (1853). Kentucky: Denton v. Franklin, 48 Ky. 28 (1848). Louisiana: Valsain et als. v. Cloutier, 3 
La. 170 (1831) Maryland: Hamilton v. Cragg, 6 Harris & Johns. 16 (Md.,1823); Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. & J. 269 
(Md.,1833). Mississippi: Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 (1859). North Carolina: Green v. Lane, 45 N.C. 102 
(1852). South Carolina: Farr v. Thompson, Executor of Farr, Cheves 37 (S.C., 1839); Carmille v. Adm’r of 
Carmille et al, 2 McMullan 454 (S.C., 1842); Mallet v. Smith, 6 Rich. Eq. 12, 20 (S.C., 1852); Willis v. Jolliffe, 
11 Rich.Eq. 447, 32 (S.C., 1860). Tennessee: Greenlow v. Rawlings, 22 Tenn. 90 (1842). Virginia: Bates v. 
Holman, 13 Va. 202 (1809); Foster’s Administrators v. Fosters, 51 Va. 485 (1853); Dunlop & als.. Harrison’s 
Executors & als., 55 Va. 251 (1858). Legal cases regarding the manumission status and inheritance rights of 
plantation masters’ enslaved families in Florida, Texas, Missouri, and the District of Columbia may exist at the 
county court level. While some southern states house county court records at central state archival facilities, 
many are still kept at county court houses or government centers. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, only 
cases that reached state appeals courts were surveyed.   
 
14
 Martha Hodes presents a similar view, noting that “for every liaison that unfolded in a county 
courtroom, there must have been others . . . in the antebellum South that never entered the record.” Hodes, 
White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the Nineteenth-Century South (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997), 3. 
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antebellum period raises the possibility that publicly recognized interracial families may 
not have been as anomalous as the low appellate numbers imply.  
 Three significant patterns exist among these cases. First is the issue of gender. All 
of the appellate testamentary cases that addressed hybrid wills attempting to free and 
legitimatize a white partner’s enslaved family consisted of a white male owner and black 
female slave. No records of white female owners seeking to manumit enslaved male 
partners appear to exist at the state appellate level. Public, quasi-marital relationships 
between white female slave owners and enslaved men may have occurred, but the dearth 
of state appellate cases detailing such relationships implies that white women did not 
employ the technique of testamentary manumission to publicly affirm and legitimatize 
interracial families. White women may have used wills to manumit enslaved partners, but 
the silence found at the state appellate court level throughout the South suggests that they 
did not do so to disinherit white relations and legitimate their relationships, but rather to 
primarily confer freedom upon their partners. The nineteenth century saw, instead, the 
emergence of white men seeking both freedom and legitimacy for their enslaved families 
through combining manumission with significant inheritance.15  
 The two remaining threads connecting these particular cases pertain to wealth and 
marital status. Most of the male testators seeking to free their enslaved families belonged 
to the planter class. According to probate court records, they held substantial land and 
slave property and were prominent members of their respective communities.16  
Significantly, they shared another, less common trait: they were all legally unmarried. 
                                                        
15
 For a detailed discussion of the legal context behind nineteenth-century slave manumission and 
inheritance cases, see Jones, Fathers of Conscience. 
 
16
 Bernie Jones’s numerous case studies of similar inheritance cases reveal the testators to be men or 
notable wealth. Jones, Fathers of Conscience.  
 10
Some were widowers, but many appeared to have never married. Thus, the relationships 
these men entered into with enslaved women were often not adulterous and, perhaps 
partly because of this fact, were not concealed from their respective communities. 
Furthermore, the prominent status of these men within local communities offered some 
degree of protection when they chose to publicly display their interracial families.  
Though the slave status of the female partner prevented these couples from 
entering into legal marriage, such relationships nonetheless transcended this narrow legal 
vision of family as a condition only available to free persons when the couples publicly 
enacted and fulfilled the traditional marital roles of husband and wife. The social 
recognition achieved through such public performance, coupled with the final efforts of 
these men to manumit and bequeath property to their partners and children through their 
wills, often achieved in death what was not possible in life: legal recognition and 
legitimization of their families through rights of inheritance.   
The southern planters who attempted this feat did so in the context of a legal 
culture attuned to the policing of the boundaries surrounding legitimate sexual relations. 
Fornication and adultery prosecutions were a standard preoccupation of nineteenth-
century county courts, though the levels and types of prosecutions varied by state. Some 
states, such as Thomas and Caroline Cramphin’s Maryland, focused heavily on bastardy 
cases.17 Other states, such as North Carolina and Virginia, honed in on a combination of 
cases involving men and women cohabiting together as husband and wife, either without 
being legally married or in spite of one or both party’s legal marriage to other people; the 
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 Of nine state appellate cases before 1860 that revolved around fornication and adultery charges, 
eight concerned the issue of bastardy. Westlaw database. 
 
 11
more salacious cases involved covert affairs and hidden romances.18 The number of cases 
reaching each state’s respective supreme courts varied similarly. North Carolina had the 
greatest number of state cases concerning offenses related to fornication and adultery, 
while Louisiana had just one. In every slave state, however, the majority of fornication 
and adultery cases did share a critical common trait: a primary preoccupation with white 
couples.19 Interracial couples did not appear to be singled out by the courts just because 
of the taboo of racial mixture, but rather as part of a larger war against immoral sexual 
activity. The Albemarle County, Virginia case of David Isaacs and Nancy West is 
demonstrative of this point. Isaacs was a white merchant and West a free mulatto baker.20 
This interracial couple was tried for illegally “cohabiting in a state of illicit commerce as 
man and wife,” but the criminal court docket also shows that two other couples were 
indicted with Isaacs and West on October 11, 1822.21 Notably, census records indicate 
that one of the three couples charged was white.22 This indictment of both white and 
interracial couples for cohabitation violations suggests that the legal policing of the color 
line was but one piece of a larger goal: eradicating sexual immorality writ large, 
regardless of racial identity.  
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 North Carolina and Virginia saw the largest number of appellate fornication and adultery cases 
before 1860 with 21 and 18, respectively. Of North Carolina’s 21 cases, seven dealt with cases concerning 
cohabitation as “man and wife.” Three of those seven involved interracial couples. Of Virginia’s 18 appellate 
fornication and adultery cases, only one involved an interracial couple. Westlaw database. 
 
19
 Alabama, North Carolina, and Virginia are the only southern states with state appellate cases 
concerning interracial fornication. Westlaw database. 
 
20
 Rothman, Notorious in the Neighborhood, 57.  
 
21
 Albemarle County Law Order Book, 1822-31, October 11, 1822, p. 51, Library of Virginia. 
 
22
 According to the Albemarle County Law Order Books, Andrew McKee and Martha Cannon were 
illegally cohabiting as man and wife. 1820 census records show that McKee’s household consisted of six free 
white persons—one female and two males aged 26-44, one male aged 16-25, and two boys under 10—and two 
male slaves. 1820 Federal Census, Albemarle County, Virginia. Roll 197, p. 274. 
 12
State Courts are products of state laws. They grow out of social climates unique to 
their respective states, and the variations in fornication and adultery prosecutions that 
reached these state courts attest to this fact. But state courts, too, are partial products of 
their relationships to other states. They do not exist in vacuums or boast impermeable 
borders. Residents travel; ideas, too. This dynamic motion of people and the ideologies 
they carry across borders is capable of creating larger regional cultures and views that 
transcend state lines. The highly polarizing beliefs and legislation surrounding the 
efficacy of slavery are but one example. The elite men who used their wills to push 
against the boundaries of what constituted legally legitimate family suggest another.  
For these few elite southern men, legitimate family was not confined by color 
line, and these men’s public social interaction and recognition of enslaved women as 
wives forced local community members to decide whether such a view could be 
accepted—or even tolerated—within their racially stratified slave societies. The ways in 
which communities struggled to reconcile these competing conceptions of family are 
often illuminated through the appellate records, themselves. Thus, the case study provides 
an ideal tool for exploring the ways in which the interracial relationships revealed in this 
group of probate cases inform our understanding of the shifting tensions over family, 
race, and marriage in southern communities. The cases of Davis v. Calvert (1833 
Maryland) and Willis v. Jolliffe (1860 South Carolina), which exemplify the significant 
commonalities surrounding the appearance and contestation of these interracial 
relationships, highlight the ways in which these men’s reimagining of family could be 
similarly adapted in the divergent regions of Maryland and South Carolina.23 
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 Willis v. Jolliffe, 11 Rich.Eq. 447, 32 (S.C., 1860); Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. & J. 269 (Md.,1833). 
 
  
 
Thomas and Caroline Cramphin 
 
Judge Thomas Cramphin epitomized Maryland’s elite society. An exceptionally 
successful planter, he owned half a dozen plantations (totaling over 6,000 acres,) and 
nearly 250 slaves, and he was reportedly worth 68,000 dollars at his death in 1830.24 His 
significant wealth also brought political and social power, and Cramphin enjoyed both 
the appointments and well-connected friendships that so often accompanied high social 
rank. Throughout his life, he served in offices as prestigious as the Maryland House of 
Representatives and spent a great deal of his public career as a judge for the Montgomery 
County Orphan’s Court.25 Importantly, a majority of cases he heard on that court dealt 
with the complicated messiness of families attempting to probate, often contest, and 
ultimately settle wills and estates. Powerful relationships defined his private life no less 
than his public affairs, and he rubbed elbows with men such as George Calvert, the 
namesake descendent of Maryland’s founding father, Lord Baltimore George Calvert.  In 
fact, Calvert numbered among Cramphin’s closest friends—as well as his neighbor.26 
Indeed, it was on one of Calvert’s abutting plantations that the lifelong bachelor finally 
met the woman with whom he would settle down and build a family: Caroline Calvert.  
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 Edward C. Papenfuse, et al., A Biographical Dictionary of the Maryland Legislature, 1635–1789, 
vol. 1, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 243. 
 
25
 Papenfuse, Biographical Dictionary, 242. 
 
26
 Margaret Law Callcott, ed., Mistress of Riversdale: The Plantation Letters of Rosalie Stier Calvert, 
1795-1821 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 379. 
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Caroline, like her mother and siblings, were slaves of George Calvert. Unlike the 
rest of Calvert’s large slave community, however, Caroline and her family were also 
Calvert’s kin. Similar to the history of so many slaves throughout the South, Caroline’s 
owner was also her father. Her mother, Eleanor Beckett, was Calvert’s mistress before he 
married a well-connected white woman.27 Calvert and Beckett’s relationship was 
representative of the long tradition of sexual relationships between masters and slaves in 
two significant ways: it was widely known in the community, but not publicly 
acknowledged; it was an extra-marital affair in which the enslaved family members were 
not primary beneficiaries of the owner’s estate.28 Nevertheless, Beckett and her children 
still experienced privileged positions among their enslaved community. They received 
deferential treatment from Calvert, including comfortable housing outside of the slave 
quarters, exemption from slave field labor, and eventually, deeded freedom.29 From this 
position, Caroline gained introduction to Cramphin on the ambiguous, but nonetheless 
more powerful ground (relative to most slaves), of a mulatto woman with the elite blood 
of the Baltimore line running through her veins.30 
Unlike the relationship between Beckett and George Calvert, the master-slave 
partnership that developed between Caroline Calvert and Cramphin was not 
commonplace within the slave South. The two became sexually involved in 1812, 
whereupon Caroline Calvert moved from her family household on George Calvert’s 
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plantation to cohabit with Cramphin. They stayed together until Cramphin’s death 18 
years later. While it was not an uncommon occurrence for slave mistresses and white 
wives to endure the tensions of living under the same roof, Cramphin’s bachelor status 
was a prerequisite for the couple to transform their cohabitation into a public 
performance of marital roles.  
Legally, however, Calvert remained a slave. Though her father did not appear to 
enforce her slave status or his ownership rights, his failure to officially manumit her until 
Cramphin voiced his wish to bequeath his estate to her (twelve years into their 
relationship) meant that the couple could not even consider legitimizing their relationship 
through the traditional legal means of marriage. Calvert’s racial classification as mulatto 
was also problematic. In 1664, Maryland became the first colony to outlaw interracial 
marriage—a position that the state maintained until the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in 
Loving v. Virginia voided such anti-miscegenation laws.31 Even if Calvert had been free, 
then, her mixed heritage would have prevented marriage to Cramphin. Maryland’s legal 
terrain was anything but hospitable to interracial couples.  
The social culture of Cramphin and Calvert’s local community, however, belies 
this legal reality. Cramphin and Calvert did not live reclusive lives, but rather integrated 
into Montgomery County society. Cramphin belonged to the Anglican Church and was a 
trustee and vestryman of his local parish.32 Four of Cramphin and Calvert’s children were 
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baptized at Prince George parish. Records do not definitively reveal the attendance 
patterns of Cramphin and his family, but Cramphin’s high level of involvement in church 
governance coupled with his children’s history of baptisms in the Parish makes it easy to 
imagine that the entire family were active and acknowledged members of the church 
community. The church served as an important space in which Cramphin and Calvert 
could publicly perform their marital roles specifically as parents of their baptized 
children. Furthermore, beginning with the birth of Cramphin and Calvert’s fifth child, 
Richard, in 1824, parish birth and baptism records dropped the use of Calvert’s maiden 
name when recording her as the mother. It is likely not coincidental that this shift 
occurred in tandem with George Calvert’s decision to formally manumit Caroline 
Calvert. This legal act allowed Calvert’s identity to be more fully connected to Cramphin. 
The dropping of Calvert’s maiden name from baptism records, then, suggests that the 
Prince George’s Parish lent institutional acceptance to Cramphin and Calvert’s 
relationship as meeting the requirements of common law marriage.33  
The legal record reveals further evidence about the values of Montgomery County 
citizens. After dealing with the prolific number of common assault charges, the Circuit 
Court spent the majority of its time policing moral infractions such as gambling and 
prostitution. Notably absent from the docket books are couples answering to fornication 
and adultery (F&A) charges—a crime of which Cramphin and Calvert would have been 
guilty.34 Cramphin’s powerful social position as a retired judge and elite planter surely 
provided him and Calvert some protection from legal censure. The fact that no other 
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unmarried couples were charged during the early nineteenth century, however, suggests 
more at play than power and politics. Rather, this disjuncture between written and 
practiced laws regarding marriage and fornication reveals a rift between legal and 
communal understandings of what constituted acceptable familial relationships.   
Cramphin, himself, embodied the tensions between these legal and social 
definitions. After spending his career creating laws in the legislature and navigating their 
application in the courts, he entered into and attempted to legitimize a relationship with 
Calvert that challenged legal demarcations of family. Such a marriage-like relationship 
with an enslaved woman similarly pushed against elite society’s world of strategic, 
advantageous marriages. Paradoxically, economically unencumbered men like Cramphin, 
who did not need to rely on the monetary advantages of marrying wealthy, propertied 
women, were ideally positioned among their peers to test the limits of what constituted 
legitimate partners and families in the antebellum South.  
Public performance and acceptance of quasi-marital relationships like Cramphin 
and Calvert’s did not automatically translate to legal acceptance. Instead, male partners 
employed their wills as devises to provide financial security and lasting legal 
legitimization for the women and children in these interracial, enslaved families. These 
wills challenged judges and juries to expand the legal definition of family across racial 
lines. Cramphin’s intimate knowledge of legal inheritance disputes from his time 
presiding over the Orphan’s Court made him particularly well suited to devise a will that 
would serve the dual purpose of legitimizing his conception of family while 
deemphasizing his white heirs at law. 
 18
Cramphin had enjoyed an extraordinarily long life, but as he reached his late 80s 
his health rapidly declined. Recognizing that his time was running out, he devised a 
detailed and systematic will in 1824. After leaving specific slaves and small bequests of 
money to select friends, he turned his full attention to “the woman now living with me, 
and by whom I have children . . . Caroline Calvert.”35 Over the next several pages, 
Cramphin painstakingly outlined how the great extent of his real and personal property, 
from “household and kitchen furniture, all my [silver] plate . . . and carriages and 
harness” to “all crops of every kind . . . together with all the wagons, carts, and ploughs,” 
was to pass to Calvert. In short, Cramphin’s dwelling plantation, the Hermitage, and 
everything there within was to be Calvert’s.36 Slaves, too, were a part of Calvert’s 
bequest from Cramphin. Significantly, Cramphin did not seem troubled or even aware of 
the irony of his decision to “give and bequeath [the] choice of ten of my negroes” to the 
formerly enslaved Calvert.37 Commitments to institutionalized slavery and to an enslaved 
family were not incompatible for Cramphin. Indeed, in his world, most slaves existed as 
property while the technically enslaved Calvert simultaneously occupied the elevated and 
blatantly human status of his socially acknowledged wifely partner. 
At the time he wrote his will, Cramphin and Calvert had lived together for twelve 
years and had a large family. Their seven surviving children, whom Cramphin listed by 
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name, were a large consideration in his estate planning.38 Here he called upon his close 
friend and his children’s grandfather, George Calvert, to act as executor of his will and 
manage substantial trust funds for the “support, education, and benefit” of the children 
until they reached their majority.39 
The only white relative Cramphin explicitly identified in his will was a nephew, 
D. John Bowie, who lived adjacent to the Hermitage. The bequest Cramphin left to 
Bowie—250 acres from the Garden Lost and Hermitage estates—and the specific and 
pointed conditions attached to this inheritance, suggest that tensions existed between him 
and at least one segment of his white extended family.40 The fallout between him and 
Bowie, however, appears to be primarily linked to Cramphin’s father, rather than his 
relationship decisions. The roots of this feud trace back to the death of Cramphin’s father, 
Thomas Cramphin, Sr., and the execution of his will in 1783—nearly thirty years before 
Cramphin and Caroline Calvert became involved. 41 Bowie evidently believed that 
Cramphin did not fairly execute the estate, for in Cramphin’s 1824 will, he made clear 
that Bowie would inherit only if he “discharge of all claim and demand against me and 
my estate either in my own right or as executor of my late father.”42  
The amount of property that Cramphin left directly to Caroline Calvert, rather 
than in trusts to be administered for her by other white men, was unusual, even for these 
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particular types of wills. More common was a testator leaving his estate to his enslaved 
family in a trust to be administered by to a reliable friend who would also serve as 
executor. This was a necessary tactic since most of the women and children in these 
relationships were still legally enslaved at the time of the testator’s death, thus ineligible 
to directly receive any bequests. Thus, the testator would use the will to instruct his 
executor to circumvent legislative restrictions on manumission by taking their families to 
free states, liquidating their real property, and transferring the assets to the women and 
children when they were safely north.43 Cramphin, however, did not think it necessary to 
instruct George Calvert to remove Caroline and the children from Maryland to a free state 
to ensure their rights of inheritance, since Calvert had already legally manumitted them 
when Cramphin drafted his will. Nonetheless, Cramphin did have second thoughts about 
attempting to leave so much directly to Caroline in fee simple. Two months after drafting 
his will, he submitted a codicil in which he “revoke[d] . . . the bequests and devise to 
Caroline Calvert.” His new plan conformed to the alternative formula that other men in 
similar positions were beginning to employ. “I do instead,” he stated, “direct that my 
trustee and executor [George Calvert] allow to the said Caroline Calvert the use of my 
carriages, harnesses, and a pair of my horses . . . the dwelling house . . . and such use of 
the servants and stock that he may think necessary for the comfortable support of herself 
and the children.”44 By technically transferring his estate to a white man, rather than a 
black woman, Cramphin hoped to leave fewer openings for any white relations to 
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successfully challenge the validity and legality of his will and thus strip his family of 
their inheritance. But even with these efforts, Cramphin’s white heirs at law challenged 
his conception of family and the legitimacy of his relationship with Calvert after his death 
on December 2, 1830.45  
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Davis v. Calvert 
 
Cramphin’s niece, Elizabeth Bowie Davis, took issue with her uncle’s unorthodox 
will. She and her husband, Thomas Davis, wasted little time in submitting a formal 
objection to Cramphin’s will and codicils that George Calvert had presented to the court 
for execution in late December.46 Less than a month after Cramphin’s death, the legal 
stage was set for a series of trial court battles whose outcomes revealed an elasticity in 
antebellum southerners’ definitions of family. Like those parties to suites over similar 
wills that appeared with increasing frequency in the following decades, the white 
relatives and mulatto partners and children who fought for rights of inheritance in Davis 
v. Calvert employed specific, formulaic strategies centered around one crucial issue: did 
these interracial women and children constitute the legitimate family of a white man in 
the eyes of the law?  
The Davis’s approach was common in these interracial inheritance cases. They 
sought to severely discredit and thus call into question the entire relationship between 
Cramphin and Calvert through a combination of character attacks and insanity charges. 
They even raised the question of Calvert’s status of free or slave—the very issue that 
Cramphin anticipated when he drafted the codicil leaving his estate to George Calvert, 
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rather than Caroline.47 The Davis’s strategy, if successful, would serve the dual purpose 
of protecting the institutions of marriage and family from definitions that crossed the 
color line, while simultaneously invalidating the will. The Davises sought to portray 
Calvert as a woman who “led a lewd and dissolute life.”48 In their portrait, she did not 
remotely fulfill the marital role of wife and mother, but instead “was a common 
prostitute” and “indulged herself in secret intrigues and lewd intercourse, unknown to the 
said Cramphin.”49 In this way, they raised the southern stereotype of the black “jezebel,” 
whose unrestrained, potent sexuality and extreme immorality could ensnare the most 
upstanding white men.50  
Such a characterization played perfectly into the crux of Davis’ argument: 
Cramphin’s will was not of his own devising, but represented “fraud, misrepresentation, 
imposition, and deceit in the procurement of said will.”51 In case Calvert’s evil nature 
was not enough to convince a jury of the impossibility of Calvert and Cramphin forming 
a legitimate, affectionate relationship, they sought to erase any doubt by painting 
Cramphin as insane. The Davis’s attorney, A.C. Magruder, argued that Cramphin was 
“aged, infirm, and credulous,” and that “the mind of the deceased was so far enfeebled, as 
to hinder him from making a valid will in any circumstances.”52  
                                                        
47
 Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. and J. 269, 1833 WL 2201 (Md.), 6.  
 
48
 Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. and J. 269, 1833 WL 2201 (Md.), 5. 
 
49
 Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. and J. 269, 1833 WL 2201 (Md.), 5. 
 
50
 For more on this traditional Jezebel role, see Deborah Gray White, Ar’n’t I a Woman?: Female 
Slaves in the Plantation South (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999), 27-46. 
 
51
 Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. and J. 269, 1833 WL 2201 (Md.), 5. 
 
52
 Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. and J. 269, 1833 WL 2201 (Md.), 12. 
 
 24
Yet, against these damning assertions, the judges of the Orphan’s Court ruled that 
such character attacks were irrelevant and a jury of Cramphin’s peers from Montgomery 
County returned a verdict in favor of Caroline Calvert and the children. The jurors from 
the community in which Calvert and Cramphin quietly lived together for nearly two 
decades accepted instead the vision presented by Calvert’s defense team that conformed 
to nineteenth-century marriage: a woman of “good conduct and character, faithful to him 
as a mistress, and a tender nurse of his old age, and a useful superintendent of his 
household.”53 Such an endorsement of their relationship through the upholding of 
Cramphin’s will after his death lends greater weight to the notion that this publicly 
acknowledged interracial relationship was accepted in the white community of 
Montgomery County. With Cramphin dead and his influence and power thus evaporated, 
a jury of peers would have been free to use this opportunity to discredit the relationship 
of an elite man whom they may have otherwise feared to cross in life. Their favorable 
verdict without the interference of Cramphin’s social and political influence, however, 
suggests that the local community was largely not adverse to Cramphin’s elevation of 
Calvert and the children to familial status. 
Like Calvert, Cramphin, too, was rehabilitated by the defense team as a man 
whose “children were acknowledged by him, and treated by him with all the care and 
affection of a father.”54 It looked as though Cramphin’s efforts to protect his family and 
confer upon them a legal status to match the social privileges they enjoyed during his life 
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would be successful. Problems arose, however, when the Davises appealed and the case 
moved from the local Montgomery County Court to the State Court of Appeals.  
In 1833, three years after Cramphin’s death, the State Court of Appeals heard the 
case of Davis v. Calvert. Unlike the local Montgomery County Court, which was familiar 
with Cramphin and Calvert and their unorthodox relationship, the State Court of Appeals 
was out of its depth and unwilling to come down decisively on one side or the other. 
Instead, the judges, who were skeptical of Cramphin and Calvert’s relationship, took a 
middle ground; they remanded the original case back to the local Montgomery County 
Court where a jury would hear the case again—this time, however, with the character 
evidence against Calvert and Cramphin that the Orphan’s Court judges had dismissed in 
1831.55  
Whether or not the inclusion of this character testimony would have turned the 
tide against Caroline Calvert’s right to inherit will never be known, for in 1835 Elizabeth 
Davis and George Calvert settled outside of court. Some scholars have recently pointed to 
this decision as an example of the unwillingness of southern society to view mixed race 
families as legitimate beneficiaries of white men’s estates.56 A closer reading of the 
Davises’ actions during the trial phases of this case and of Elizabeth Davis’s conditions 
of settlement in 1835, however, reveal sentiments that directly counter such a claim.  
During the five years between Cramphin’s death and the settlement agreement, 
Caroline Calvert and her children lived in economic limbo. Calvert did not have rights to 
the quarterly payments from her annuity, nor did her children have access to their trusts, 
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since the distribution of Cramphin’s assets was frozen and execution halted. Even as the 
Davises challenged Calvert’s inheritance rights, however, they nonetheless allowed 
Cramphin’s estate to be used for her family’s support while the two sides fought. As early 
as August of 1831, Thomas Davis gave “his consent to the support of Caroline Calvert 
and her children out of the estate of Thomas Cramphin, deceased.” Furthermore, he 
endorsed the particular uses of such support to include “as much money as may be 
necessary for . . . the educating of her children.”57 This consent was renewed at least 
twice between 1831 and 1835.58 
Davis’s settlement letter reveals that she was not interested in completely 
disinheriting Caroline Calvert and the children, but rather in receiving a portion of 
Cramphin’s estate. In exchange for $30,000—roughly half of Cramphin’s net worth—
Davis would let George Calvert maintain control of Cramphin’s real and personal 
property.59 Significantly, she explicitly stated that Calvert was to execute the remainder 
of Cramphin’s estate “as . . . expressed and declared in the said instruments of writing, 
purporting to be the last will and testament, and codicils thereto, of said Thomas 
Cramphin.”60 In other words, after Davis successfully secured a portion of her uncle’s 
large state, she used her settlement letter to deliberately validate the remainder of the very 
will she had previously sought to overturn. Caroline Calvert and her children would 
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inherit, after all, and with the willing support of Cramphin’s closest white relative. Thus, 
for these white relations, local jurors, and Montgomery County judges, Cramphin’s 
interracial partner and children appeared to embody a legally and socially acceptable 
adaptation of legitimate family in antebellum Maryland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Amy and Elijah Willis 
 
Thirty years after Cramphin entered into his partnership with Calvert, and over 
five hundred miles deep south of Maryland, a wealthy South Carolina planter named 
Elijah Willis contemplated a similar relationship. Born into Williston, South Carolina’s 
founding family in 1797, Willis inherited much wealth from his father, which he swiftly 
moved to capitalize upon through substantial investments in lumber and a large enslaved 
workforce to operate his mill. Elijah Willis was the epitome of the eligible bachelor, yet 
he was among the minority of wealthy men, like Cramphin, who remained unwed.61 
Under circumstances reminiscent of Cramphin and Calvert’s beginnings, the woman 
Willis would spend the rest of his life with was a slave on the neighboring plantation of 
Willis’s friend, William Kirkland. 
Amy was her name. Like Caroline Calvert, she was not allowed the luxury of 
legal marriage; her status as a slave excluded her from the legal personhood required for 
such contracts. Consequently, any relationships Amy entered were not protected under 
the law. Little is known of her past before Willis purchased her around 1842.62 During 
her years in Kirkland’s slave community, however, it is clear that Amy and another of 
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Kirkland’s slaves had three children together.63 Willis did not separate Amy from her 
three young boys at the time of purchase; in 1842 Elder, Ellick, and Phillip all moved into 
the slave quarters on Willis’s plantation with their mother. Amy’s own mother also 
moved from Kirkland’s ownership to Willis’s. The fate of the enslaved man with whom 
Amy at one time lived, however, remains unknown. 
Shortly after purchasing Amy in 1842, Willis began an intimate relationship with 
her.64 Unlike the majority of master-slave liaisons, which were generally hidden and 
often coerced sexual encounters, Amy and Willis’s relationship appeared to be a long-
term, affectionate, and public undertaking. By the early 1850s, when Willis and Amy had 
been partners for nearly a decade and raised five children together, Elijah began devising 
a way to both free his family from slavery and make them the legal heirs of his estate. In 
fact, the legal obstacle Amy and Willis faced was linked specifically to Amy’s slave 
status, rather than laws governing interracial marriage. As property, slaves were not 
allowed the legal right to marry. Yet for free African Americans, no restrictions, 
whatsoever, existed on marriage.65 Unlike Maryland, which had outlawed interracial 
marriage since the seventeenth century, South Carolina did not have such statutes in place 
before the Civil War. Thus, had Amy been free in antebellum South Carolina, she and 
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Willis would not have faced any legal obstacles to marriage.66 The paths to freedom, 
however, grew increasingly restricted as the nineteenth century wore on. By 1820, the 
only route a slave owner had left if he desired to emancipate a slave within the borders of 
South Carolina was to petition the state legislature—an often unsuccessful undertaking.67 
In light of these legal realities, the only way Willis could gain legal legitimacy and 
protection for Amy and the children was to first secure their freedom—an act that 
required looking outside of South Carolina. In 1852 he settled Amy and the children in 
the more progressive Maryland as he tried to legally emancipate them there. However, 
this first attempt failed for unknown reasons and Willis returned to Maryland to bring 
Amy and the children back home.  
Willis’s second attempt to secure Amy and the children’s freedom, this time in 
Ohio, was meticulously planned and ultimately successful. In 1854—a full year before 
their move north—Willis made the long journey to Cincinnati to craft a will specifically 
designed to ensure freedom and inheritance for Amy and the children. Unlike Cramphin, 
who possessed the legal expertise to construct his own will, Willis secured the aid of 
prominent abolitionist attorney John Jolliffe in drafting his will. Yet an abolitionist Willis 
most certainly was not. While Willis went to great lengths to rid Amy and the children of 
their legal status as slaves, he, like Cramphin, made no provisions to emancipate the 
dozens of other slaves under his ownership.68 In fact, he intended to sell off these slaves, 
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along with his other real property in South Carolina, to finance the new life he planned 
for himself and his family in Ohio.69 While the family made it successfully to Ohio, 
Willis did not have the chance to enact this last part of his plan.  
On May 21, 1855, the Willises arrived in Cincinnati. Their two youngest 
daughters clung to Willis’s hands as the family made their way to an awaiting carriage. 
According to the press, “just as he went to reach one of the small children into [the 
carriage]” he stopped and “breathed heavily.”70 Amy worriedly asked him if he was 
experiencing another “attack of palpitation of the heart.”71 He nodded, but before a doctor 
could be called, Willis fell to the ground and died mere minutes after safely delivering his 
family to the free North. Amy, the children, and her mother went, with Willis’s body, to 
the Dumas House, a hotel four blocks off the wharf “for colored people, kept by a colored 
man.”72 Willis was interred on June 7, 1855, in one of Cincinnati’s African American 
cemeteries.73  
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Willis’s death thrust Amy and her children into a set of court battles that would 
determine her inheritance rights and the legitimacy of her family.74 The first hurdle that 
Willis’s executor and abolitionist attorney John Jolliffe faced was getting the will entered 
into probate in Barnwell, South Carolina. Willis had two wills in existence. He wrote the 
first in 1846, before he and Amy had any children, that was rather unremarkable. In it, he 
did what was normative for unwed men without children: he left his estate to his brothers 
and sisters.75 The 1854 will that he drafted with Jolliffe, however, disinherited these 
white heirs at law in favor of his enslaved family. When Jolliffe arrived in Barnwell with 
the 1854 will in hand, the white relatives who would inherit according to the 1846 will 
immediately contested the more recent will on the grounds that Willis was insane and that 
Amy and the children were still considered slaves in South Carolina, regardless of their 
free status in Ohio, and thus ineligible to inherit property. The jury sided with the white 
relatives, and Jolliffe’s next step was to appeal to the South Carolina Law Court of 
Appeals.  
As in Maryland, the state appellate justices did not find for either the interracial 
family or the white relatives, but rather remanded the case back to Barnwell County for a 
new trial.76 Unlike the Maryland case, however, in which the justices voiced skepticism 
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about Cramphin and Calvert’s relationship, the South Carolina justices believed Willis to 
clearly be in his right mind, and thus could “discover no legal basis upon which the 
verdict [against admitting the 1854 will to probate] can stand.”77 These assurances of the 
legality of Willis’s second will by the South Carolina justices appear to have been 
persuasive to Barnwell residents, for the jury ruled in favor of Jolliffe and the 1854 will 
during the retrial.78 Over a year after Willis’s death, his second will was finally recorded 
in Barnwell County, but his white relatives remained undeterred. They halted the will’s 
execution with challenges that mirrored those employed by Cramphin’s white relatives 
over twenty years earlier: insanity of the testator, undue influence of the African 
American woman, and questionable legal status of the woman and children as slave or 
free.79  
The culmination of this final inheritance court battle over Elijah Willis’s estate 
was the South Carolina appellate court case of Willis v. Jolliffe, which was heard on the 
eve of the Civil War in 1860. Perhaps surprisingly, Amy won. The significance of this 
case, however, lies not only in the verdict, but also in the rich testimony enshrined in its 
pages. The detailed witness descriptions provide a window into the ways in which 
members of the Barnwell Community viewed and understood Amy and Willis’s 
relationship, while simultaneously suggesting ways in which Amy and Willis’s actions in 
the household and in public related to the social functions of marriage.
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Willis v. Jolliffe 
 
In the case of Willis v. Jolliffe, over a dozen acquaintances, neighbors, and friends 
testified in the South Carolina court as to the nature of Amy and Elijah’s relationship and 
the overall character of both. Notably, Amy did not testify. In fact, she did not return to 
South Carolina for any of the court battles. Slaves did not have the legal right to testify in 
the courts, but according Ohio’s ban on slavery, coupled with Willis’s intent to free her, 
meant that Amy attained the legal status of a freeperson when her feet touched Ohio soil. 
Thus, she would have been eligible to testify on her own behalf. Her legal status in 
relation to South Carolina law, however, was more ambiguous. Willis’s 1854 will 
contained a clause directing Jolliffe to “bring . . . the said Amy and her children . . . to 
Ohio,” where they would be free.80 South Carolina’s Act of 1841, however, outlawed 
testamentary manumissions, and in so doing called Amy’s free status into question if she 
returned to the state.81 The possibility of re-enslavement likely deterred her from 
returning to the South. Amy’s previous Barnwell neighbors, therefore, were left to 
characterize Willis’s life with her and the children. While varying tones of disapproval 
wafted from a number of the depositions, the records show a virtual consensus among all 
of the witnesses regarding Willis and Amy’s relations both in the home and in public. As 
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Jonathan Pender, one of Willis’ acquaintances, attested, Willis and Amy’s relationship 
was “generally reported and believed in the neighborhood.”82 Those closer to the couple, 
such as their neighbor Ary Woolley, testified that Amy and Willis “acted pretty much as 
man and wife.”83  
While Willis, Amy, and the children were distinguished as master and slaves 
under the law, they lived domestic life with the social status of a family. A longtime 
friend of Willis and Amy, Reason Woolley, who often visited the Willis home, noted 
that, “Willis and Amy lived in the same house [and] slept in the same house.” Another 
friend of Willis was particularly struck that, while dining, Willis sat “with one of the 
children in his lap…giving them the best victuals from the table, and…treated them as his 
own children.”84 Not only did Willis acknowledge that the children were his, but he 
“acted as a father towards them…nurse[d] them, etc.”85 One of the most telling signs of 
Willis’s emotional attachment is found in Reason Woolley’s statement that Willis was 
“distressed when one of the children died.”86  
Willis did not confine his enactment of the roles of husband and father within the 
walls of his plantation home, however; he presented Amy and the children publicly as his 
family, and thus in a manner far above the status of slaves, or even free blacks. As one 
witness who saw the Willises during their journey to Ohio remarked, the family “had, as 
baggage, several new trunks, and no such luggage as negroes usually carry…[and] were 
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all dressed in much better style than is usual with negroes.”87 In fact, Willis did not 
hesitate to identify Amy and the children as his family to people he encountered during 
their travels. In response to train conductor James Meredith’s question about whether he 
was selling the “family of negroes,” Elijah unambiguously answered that “he was not 
taking them to Hamburg for sale, but was on his way to Cincinnati, Ohio, with them, and 
. . . he spoke of them as his family.”88 
Willis’s unfailing efforts over a period of years to secure freedom and legal status 
as his heirs for Amy and the children is an equally compelling example of the quasi-
marital relationship between Amy and Willis. As Willis told one friend, “I have travelled 
a great deal and spent a heap of money to fix my business,” making sure that his family 
would be protected from slavery and provided for after his death.89 It also indicated that, 
regardless of the social acceptance Willis had won in Barnwell, his relationship with 
Amy nonetheless stood outside of the narrower legal definition of family. At least as 
early as 1850, Willis was actively seeking advice and pursuing various plans to legally 
protect his family that, regardless of communal recognition, was not legally recognized.90 
Not only were his efforts common knowledge, but community members also noticed his 
“great anxiety about…what he had best do about them to get them free.”91 Willis’s 
consistently emotional reaction about his fears for Amy and the children and his 
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unceasing efforts to fulfill his husbandly role of protecting and providing for his family 
highly align with the ideals and actions of institutional marriage.  
Accounts of Amy’s behavior at home and in town and descriptions of her 
reception by community members are similarly indicative of a wife’s role and treatment 
in domestic and public spaces. Besides running the household and tending to the children, 
“Amy traded considerably at Williston…riding in Willis’ carriage” to run her errands.92 
Tellingly, a neighbor noted that “the merchants generally let her have what she 
wanted…on credit” and Willis “would pay all such bills without objection or inquiry” on 
his subsequent visits to town.93 One witness perhaps summed it up best when he claimed 
that Amy “trade[d] largely,” and “as freely as a white woman.”94 Even members of 
Willis’s white family recognized the couple’s relationship and Amy’s social 
identification as married and free. James Willis, Elijah’s nephew, welcomed their 
business at his Williston shop and publicly addressed his uncle’s partner as “Aunt 
Amy.”95  
The extraordinary lengths Willis went through to protect Amy and the children 
leaves little doubt that his actions were rooted in love and familial duty. Yet for Amy, 
evidence of her affection and motivations is far less obvious. Did she act out of love or 
opportunity, affection or manipulation? Most likely it was some combination of the 
above. Amy certainly had much more to gain materially, economically, and socially from 
the relationship than did Willis, but two particular events suggest that her involvement 
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with Willis was at least partially built out of affection. During the family’s first attempt at 
relocating to the North, Amy and the children remained where Willis had left them 
unattended for an extended period of time, and willingly returned with Willis to South 
Carolina when this first attempt at manumission apparently failed.96 In a situation where 
she had plenty of time to flee with her children after Willis left her unattended, she 
instead patiently waited for him to return.  
Amy’s emotional attachment to Willis was also visible during the family’s next 
attempt at freedom—this time, in Ohio. As Willis and his friend, Reason Woolley, 
discussed his plan to secure Amy and the children’s freedom in Ohio while Willis would 
return to South Carolina and prepare to permanently move to Cincinnati, Woolley noted 
that “[Amy] wanted to come back with him,” but Willis replied “that when he got her out 
of South Carolina she should never come back again.”97 In both situations, the distress 
Amy showed at the prospect of being separated from Willis and her failure to abandon 
Willis when left alone for months in Maryland are not the actions of a slave simply using 
her master’s affections to escape from slavery. 
That so many witnesses in this small town could provide so detailed a rendering 
of this couple’s life together is telling. Willis and Amy functioned as social members of 
the community and adapted the language of marriage to suit their otherwise precariously-
footed relationship. Of course, the unorthodox couple still attracted varying degrees of 
disapproval within the community—indeed, testimony from the case alludes to this 
reality. According to one witness, Willis himself stated that it was “distressing to him” 
that “the connection he had formed was evidently unpleasant to his relations and 
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acquaintances.”98 The preponderance of testimony suggests, however, that this unrest was 
weak enough that the Willises did not experience notable social or economic isolation.  
Significantly, the most overt expression of displeasure over this public interracial 
relationship that is preserved in the documentary record occurred after Willis’ death. 
Once the ruling in favor of Amy Willis was handed down by the South Carolina Court of 
Appeals in 1860, a group of white men from Barnwell County petitioned the state 
legislature to make it “an indictable offense for any white man . . . to live in open 
connection with a negro or mulatto woman, as his wife, whether married or unmarried.”99 
No doubt Willis’s powerful economic and social status in Barnwell County accounted, in 
part, for the delay of such overt objection to relationships like his and Amy’s until after 
his death. This petition inadvertently reveals, however, that the people of Barnwell were 
trying to make sense of something much larger than one odd couple. The men of 
Barnwell justified their position precisely because they detected a new and concerning 
trend: “white men in this community are frequently found living in open connection with 
negro and mulatto women.”100 Clearly, the instances of publicly displayed interracial 
relationships recorded in the legal record through probate court cases account for only a 
portion of the relationships that existed. For the community of Barnwell, South Carolina, 
Willis and Amy were not some aberration, but rather the latest case in a recent trend 
towards public, quasi-marital interracial relationships.  
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In the utter absence of legal protection and sanctioning of a relationship that 
crossed the supposedly socially unacceptable lines of race and slavery, Willis and Amy 
nonetheless achieved the social recognition and status of a white, legally married couple 
within their native Williston. With the help of the abolitionist and popular presses, 
however, the unconventional application of marital roles and conception of family 
embodied by Amy and Willis’s relationship reached a national audience.   
For the majority of the literate Barnwell County community, local newspapers, 
such as The Daily South Carolinian, likely served as the primary vehicle for transmitting 
the information about the case, all the way from Willis’s shocking death in Ohio to the 
eventual ruling in Amy’s favor five years later. Yet it is important to remember that, for 
most of these locals, the notable relationship between Amy and Willis was already well 
known; within Barnwell County, newspaper reports regarding the couple served as a 
means to stay apprised of the court case’s progression, rather than as an introduction to 
the unconventional circumstances of Amy and Willis’s relationship. For those outside of 
this rural community, however, these newspaper accounts were a critical gateway 
through which a larger public was presented with an envisioning of nineteenth-century 
marriage and family that challenged racial boundaries.  
The dramatic and tragic circumstances of Willis’s death coupled with the 
fascinating and unlikely tale of the family he left behind attracted the interest of 
newspapers across the country. Over two-dozen articles appeared in no fewer than 
nineteen daily and weekly newspapers between Willis’s death in 1855 and the final ruling 
awarding inheritance rights to Amy and the children in 1860.101  Of interest here is not 
                                                        
101
 The following newspapers reported on the Willis family: Cincinnati Gazette, Frederick Douglass’ 
Paper (NY), Wisconsin Patriot, Cincinnati Columbian, Baltimore Sun, Daily Ohio Statesman, National Era 
 41
only the simple volume of responses, which is notable, but rather the regional and 
political diversity of those papers that chose to follow the case. Given Ohio’s central role 
in the Willis story, from supplying abolitionist attorney (and Cincinnati resident) John 
Jolliffe to housing Amy and the children after Elijah’s death on the shore of the Ohio 
River, it is not surprising that nearly one third of the press’s articles arose from Ohio 
newspapers. The remaining two thirds, however, ranged from Vermont to Georgia to 
Wisconsin and numerous points in between. The audience, too, was varied. Presses of 
prominent abolitionists like Frederick Douglass and William Lloyd Garrison as well as 
mainstream newspapers published the Willis family’s story. Thus, it was not only radicals 
and abolitionists who were introduced to Amy and Elijah’s unlikely partnership, but 
citizens operating well outside of these activist circles.   
Contextualized within this politically and geographically diverse press interest, 
the way in which these newspapers portrayed Amy and Willis’s relationship carries even 
greater significance. While still acknowledging Willis’s and Amy’s separate legal 
identities in the South as owner and slave, the press often chose to represent the couple 
according to the way in which Willis and Amy had lived for so many years: as husband 
and wife. These articles seemingly embraced images of the couple as married without 
trepidation or judgmental tones, stating simply that Willis’s “wife, Mary Amy Turner and 
children . . . are mulattoes” previously under Willis’s ownership who would now inherit 
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his substantial estate.102 An exception to this trend in coverage concerns newspapers in 
South Carolina and Georgia. Even so, while they did not go so far as their northern 
counterparts, who portrayed the couple as married, they nevertheless recognized their 
relationship as more than master and slave. Indeed, the simple acts of southern 
newspapers choosing to refer to Amy by name and the children as Willis’s lent 
legitimacy to the relationship through the act of public recognition. Even with these more 
reserved southern interpretations, the thrust of many printed representations of the 
Willises is clear; these presses largely categorized Amy and Willis’s interracial 
relationship under the umbrella of marriage, even in light of their unorthodox history as 
slave and owner. Furthermore, the ease with which they seemed to do so suggests that 
this was not the nineteenth-century media’s first exposure to such couples. 
The importance of this newspaper coverage lies not only in the ability of the 
diverse presses to conceive of and present Amy and Willis’s relationship as marriage, but 
also in the tools they used to do so. In print culture, language was crucial. For 
newspapers, as for any type of printed press, the deployment of language was necessarily 
strategic and designed to resonate with an intended audience. The presses that chose to 
represent Willis and Amy as partners in a marriage used language infused with an 
ideology their readership was sure to understand: romantic love. It was not enough to say 
that the couple had been “married . . . about thirteen years.”103 To more easily make sense 
in the larger ideological terrain of the mid-nineteenth century, language that matched the 
growing romantic understanding of marriage as a product of love, rather than economic 
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strategy, was employed by many newspapers. That “Mr. Willis . . . always manifested 
towards her and the children a warm affection” revealed the couple’s conformity to these 
marital standards.104 People around the nation read of Elijah and Amy Willis not as 
master and slave, but as committed partners—as husband and wife. 
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Conclusion 
 
The cases of the Cramphins and Willises cannot be considered common, but 
neither were they anomalous. Antebellum communities in the majority of slave states 
experienced instances where elite men discarded the boundaries of slavery and race and 
challenged legal and social conceptions of family and marriage in very public ways. The 
dispersion of appellate court records further suggests that these men’s legal challenges to 
dominant conceptions of racially homogenous marriage and family occurred with 
increasing frequency and surprising levels of success during the mid-nineteenth century. 
The 1833 Maryland case of Davis v. Calvert and the 1860 case of Willis v. Jolliffe 
provide windows onto the similar ways that two elite men in different times and places 
within the antebellum South conceived of and challenged the socially acceptable 
boundaries of legitimate marriage and family. These men, along with their enslaved 
partners, pushed their communities to expand conceptions of marriage and family to 
include interracial formulations through public enactment and assumption of marital 
roles.  
Court testimony and, in the case of Barnwell residents, legal petitions, suggest 
that these local communities did not respond with unified levels of acceptance toward 
such relationships. But at the same time, the depositions of community members reveal 
that these couples were nevertheless viewed through the lens and language of marriage 
and family. Regardless of whether locals were happy about such relationships, their 
testimony, coupled with church records and newspaper accounts, implies that they 
 45
amended their understanding of legitimate family to include the interracial renderings 
introduced by elite white men within their respective Maryland and South Carolina 
communities.  
The motivations and emotions of the enslaved women, unlike their male partners, 
remain largely obscured. Even in this absence, however, court testimony is still capable 
of illuminating ways in which these women may have experienced their elevated public 
social rank. Even in the absence of Amy and Caroline’s voices, court, church, and 
newspaper records suggest that both women possessed and wielded a level of power in 
public and within the household that aligned with their socially conferred status of free, 
married white women.  
By recovering these couples’ stories, the history of interracial family in the United 
States takes on new and unexplored dimensions. These cases complicate many historians’ 
traditional conceptions of master-slave relationships as open secrets that were known 
within society, but not publicly acknowledged or legitimatized through social or legal 
channels by the involved white men or their local communities. The parallels between the 
lives and experiences of the Willises and Cramphins offer possibilities for reimagining 
not only the history of interracial families in some southern communities, but the larger 
paths leading to Loving v. Virginia.  
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